Finally, some studies find no effect of the adoption of intuition on cooperation 41, 42. Indeed, while some researchers contend that intuition induces cooperative behaviors while reflection stimulates selfishness 8, 33, 37, 38, others argue that deliberation and reflection act as a hurdle to selfish impulses and lead to prosociality and cooperation 13, 39, 40. Different definitions of intuition can, at least in part, explain opposing results in the analysis of intuitive behavior and prosociality 1, 35, 36.
Other contributions define intuition as a mode of reasoning that is not fully unconscious and automatic, but entails some reflection in the form of heuristics 32, 33, 34 in these studies, intuition is assumed to be substantially slower than in the previous approach. A large body of this literature relates intuition to automatic and unconscious processes that occur extremely fast, possibly in less than a second 27 several contributions on the relationship between prosocial behavior and ego depletion 10, 13, 28, 29, 30 or cognitive load 12, 31 take this perspective. While response times are related to the mode of reasoning in important respects 23, the interpretation of results obtained under time pressure requires careful consideration 9, 24.Īs already noted 25, different theories of dual process cognition identify different attributes to, respectively, intuition and deliberation 5, 26. In this work, we manipulate the mode of reasoning by imposing a 10-second time constraint on decision-making 6, 22. Some experimental evidence is available for pure coordination games 21, suggesting that intuition leads to rely more on culturally focal options. Accordingly, coordinated play on either action can be interpreted as a social norm, i.e., a social convention 17, 18.Įven if the stag hunt game has been widely investigated with experimental methods 19, 20, to our knowledge, there is no previous attempt to empirically assess the effects that the tension between intuition and deliberation has on the choice between stag and hare. In the basic game, the opposition between coordination on stag and coordination on hare can be seen as a parable for social situations in which coordination can be pursued on two different levels: coordinating on better rewarding, but necessarily collaborative actions, and coordinating on less rewarding actions, which do not require collaboration.
In this paper we consider the stag hunt game, which can be interpreted as a social dilemma involving prosociality 16. They suggest that humans make decisions under two modes of reasoning, namely intuition, fast and relying on heuristics, and deliberation, slow and based on careful scrutiny of costs and benefits 3, 4, 5.įollowing this insights, a number of recent contributions have run incetivized experiments to investigate the effects that the mode of reasoning has on prosocial behavior in a variety of games 6, 7, such as: prisoner dilemmas and public good games 8, 9, dictator games 9, 10, 11, ultimatum games 12, 13, deception games 14, and allocation decisions 15. Dual process theories of decision-making 2 are well established in cognitive and social psychology. The recent literature in judgment and decision-making has shown an upsurge of interest to understand prosociality from a dual process perspective 1.
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